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RESPONSE T< I A I1! Kl J 11W 1 ARGUMENT
Poin
THE MARSHALING REQUIREMENT IS INAPPLICABLE
TO THIS APPEAL
The state erroneously contents that the appellant failed to comply w1th
her obligation to marshal the evidence, i no suae > •..: >iMMJK- .U:r:>. ^ .. . s
in l\\o rcsped'i

niusl 111 i ir

•

\\ the issue is one of lack of evidence. The marshaling

••- ^ < ^ -

,n '

•

.vwable lor

requirement applies only when challenging findings of fact. See Dishinger v.
Potter, 2001 i i A pp. 2000. Ar p id ^6 nt

ni)

u. the appellant had 110

obligation to marshal evidence.
• I 1 n i l II

THE EXEPTION TO THE PRESERVATION REQUIREMENT
HERE EXISTS TO AVOID A MANIFEST INJUSTICE

I IK appellant demonstratec

-:

• ,-.U':M

* r\l r- ;• iu ineffective assistance of
counsel and that counsel should have objected to the jury instructions that
were inconsistent with the charge in the information. Second, the ~t~+e
entirely failed to provide any facts from which me jury could have IOUMU
under proper instructions

o
2

;we f

M^^

in to custody and that llic nrnis nmihined had III lunrliorml equivalent of a
directed. \ ei diet

Whether exceptional circumstances or plain error, the magnitude of
the discrepancies in the jury instructions should have been
ui.u uMn. In State v. Holgate, .

e
ined

unA.

plain error for the trial court not lo

discharge a defendant on the basis of insufficient evidence and held,
"Section 77-17-3 states that when the evidentiary defect is apparent to the
trial court, the court shall discharge uie defendant. It necessai
the trial court plamh

1.

1 .!

hi ! . !•'• M >•' ! !.'

\\A'\ .1 d l! 1, !aih f«i

disclun^s' Ih " Idendant when the evidence is apparent to the court." T h e
court further held that "[w]hile it is difficult for the court on appeal to dictate
w h e n an evidentiary defect was apparent to the trial court, there is a certain
point at which an evidentiary insufficiency is so I n m 1: m il I in id a menial
111 il il ",» HI 111 I 1 I lir plain 1 1 mil lm illlin III 1 ill
'v-mnle

:

null 11 Il I liseharne the d e f e n d a n t .

the case in which the state presents no evidence to support an

essential element oi a erimin.il charge. The plain error exception would
serve to avoid a manifest injustice in such a case," u. at ^ J 1.
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Point III.
THE APPELLANT ADEQUATLY BRIEFED THE COURT
ON THE MERITS
There is no rule or law the appellant is aware of that states how many
pages are required or how many citations must be made before an issue is
adequately briefed. The appellant briefed every issue she raised with proper
citations, cited 29 cases and sufficiently linked her citations with her
arguments.

IV.

THERE IS NOT A SCINTILLA OF EVIDENCE THE
APPELLANT HAD COMMITTED OR WAS ABOUT TO
COMMIT ANY OFFENSE, THE ARRESTING OFFICER
LACKED STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO TAKE THE
APPELLANT IN TO CUSTODY AND VIOLATED
CLEARLY ESTABLISHED CONSTITUTIONAL
PROHIBITIONS

Under both Utah State Law and the Constitution an officer must have
probable cause to take a person in to custody. The state's reliance on State v.
Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568 (Utah 1991), State v. Trane. 57 P.3d 1052 (Utah
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2002), and State v. Pena Flores, 14 P.3d 698 (Utah App. 2000), is misplaced.
Section 76-8-305 applies to a multitude of police-citizen encounters and
each case must be evaluated on its own facts and circumstances. The section
is not intended as a blanked prohibition so as to criminalize any conduct
evincing interference where the action of the officer is not authorized by law
I
or is not intended as a shield for police misconduct. !
The foregoing cases are clearly distinguishable from the instant case.
In all three cases the defendants were advised of the officer's intention to
effectuate an arrest, and in all three cases the officers did have probable
cause. In Gardiner the defendant physically interfered with an investigation
after being informed of that intent which was based on the officers own
observations of suspicious conduct. In Trane the defendant committed the
act of disorderly conduct in the presence of the officers, and in Pena Flora
the defendant verbally interfered in the investigation of known gang
members and refused to identify himself. In the instant case the officer did
not observe any criminal conduct or advised the appellant that she was a
suspect.

Deputy

Barnes

proceeded

entirely

on

unreliable,

unverified

allegations and presumptions. Presumptions and conjectures are neither facts
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nor evidence. And although the appellant provided the officer voluntarily
with a reasonable explanation for her action, Deputy Barnes entirely
disregarded the appellants explanation and the totality of the circumstances.
Most of all, the appellant was totally unaware that she was the subject of a
criminal investigation.
Deputy Barnes testimony provides that although she characterized the
appellant's seizure as an investigative detention, there was no actual
investigation conducted. An investigative detention implies that the
obtrusive act is for the purpose of investigation. Where no investigation is
undertaken the detention cannot be considered investigatory and rises to the
level of arrest. Significant here is also the fact that the officer not only
forcefully extricated the appellant from her car, but forcefully placed her on
the ground and in handcuffs.
Warrantless arrests in Utah are authorized

only in limited

circumstances and are governed under section 77-7-2. The section provides:

77-7-2. Arrest by peace officers.
A peace officer may make an arrest under authority of a warrant or may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
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(1) for any public offense committed or attempted in the presence of any
peace officer; "presence" includes all of the physical senses or any device
that enhances the acuity, sensitivity, or range of any physical sense, or
records the observations of any physical senses;
(2) when he has reasonable cause to believe a felony or a class A
misdemeanor has been committed and has reasonable cause to believe the
person arrested has committed it;
(3) when he has reasonable cause to believe the person has committed a
public offense, and there is reasonable cause for believing the person may:
(a) flee or conceal himself to avoid arrest;
(b) destroy or conceal evidence of the commission of the offense; or
(c) injure another person or damage property belonging to another
Person.
Those statutory provisions require the constitutional equivalent of probable
cause. In Salt Lake City v. Smoot 921 P.2d 1003 (Utah App. 1996) where
the defendant interfered in an arrest stemming from the officers attempt to
enforce a warrant, the court held that based on Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1,
there are three levels of police-citizen encounters, each requiring a different
degree of justification under the Fourth Amendment. The first level occurs
when an officer approaches and questions a suspect. An officer may stop and
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question a person at any time so long as that person is not detained against
his [or her] will. The next level is reached when an officer temporarily seizes
a person. In order to legally effect a temporary seizure, the officer must have
articulable [reasonable] suspicion that the suspect has or is about to commit
a crime, and the detention must be limited in scope. The third level is arrest
which requires probable cause for the officer to believe that a crime has been
or is about to be committed, id. at 1006. Smoot demonstrates the court has
recognized that the strictures of the Fourth Amendment apply where a
defendant is charged with interference in a detention of arrest. And in Pena
Flores supra 14 P.3d at 700 the court specifically declined to address
whether a person could be lawfully arrested for interfering with a level one
encounter.
What should have been no more then a level one encounter in the
instant case turned instead in to a full blown arrest because as the officer
testified, the appellant "refuse [d] to cooperate with [her] request to exit the
vehicle on her own power."
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when an officer without
reasonable suspicion or probable cause approaches an individual, the
individual has a right to ignore the police and go about his business. And any
refusal to cooperate, without more, does not furnish the minimal level of
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objective justification needed for a detention or seizure. See Terry supra 392
U.S. 32-33, Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491,498 (1983), Florida v. Bostick,
501 U.S. 429,437 (1991), Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,125 (2000), and
Hibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177, 187 (2004).
Deputy Barnes not only lacked statutory authority to take the
appellant in to custody, she also lacked statutory authority to use force. Utah
law provides for the use of force as follows:
77-7-7. Force in making arrest.
If a person is being arrested and flees or forcible resists after being
informed of the intention to make the arrest, the person arresting may use
reasonable force to effect the arrest. (Emphasis added)

Deputy Barnes used force against the appellant who never attempted to
escape, who was being arrested although this was not verbalized and who
never verbally or physically threatened the officer with harm. Deputy Barnes
has no justification for her action. A person should not have to live in fear of
victimization by those sworn to protect them from crimes as well as those
who live around them who commit crimes.
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V.

THE JURY INSTRUCTIN WERE IMPROPER

Importantly, the jury instructions contained parts of a crime of which
the appellant was never charged in the information. In Cole v. Arkansas,
333 U.S. 196, 201 (1948) the Supreme Court held that "[i]t is as much of
a violation of due process to send an accused to prison following
conviction of a charge on which he was never tried as it would be to
convict him upon a charge that was never made." In Utah it is well
settled that the state may not allege a particular mode of committing an
offense and then convict a defendant for having committed a different
mode of that offense. See State v. Hyams, 230 P. 349,350 (Supreme
Court of Utah 1924).

Although "there is no indication that the jury struggled in
understanding any of the terms within the instructions" jurors may not
decide legal questions nor draw conclusions of law from the facts except as
guided by instructions of the court. See Coray v Southern Pa. Co. J 947, 185
P. 2d 963,certioraray granted and reversed on other grounds, 335 U.S. 520
(1949). Whether an officer was authorized to make an arrest was a question
of law for the court and the court was required to charge the jury in specific
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terms under what state of particular facts, when found, a detention or arrest
was authorized, UCA 78-21-3.

CONCLUSION

It was the state's burden to prove the elements of the crime charged in
the information and it failed to do so. The appellant was arrested based on
presumptions, was prosecuted based on presumptions, and subsequently
convicted by a jury required to presume what the law is. In submitting to the
jury instructions without any guidance by the court on the legal issues and in
including an offense not charged in the information, the jury instructions
were tantamount to a directed verdict, in violation of the Due Process Clause.
The appellant respectfully hereby renews her request that this
conviction be reversed.

Respectfully submitted this 1$ 4h day of January 2007

Maria Joyce Jacobs
Appellant pro se
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I, Maria J. Jacobs, hereby certify that I delivered eight copies of the
foregoing reply brief of the appellant to the Utah Court of Appeals, 450
South State Street, 5th floor, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230, and two
copies to the Salt Lake County District Attorney's Office, 111 East
Broadway, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

Maria J: Jacobs
Appellant pro se
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